(for the contemporary Everettian) is a phenomenon that emerges at the macroscopic level via decoherence. That is, in the Everettian case as in the (simplified) Sleeping Beauty case, there is a single world in which the agent is uncertain of her location. (2009: 87) We are happy to grant that in one sense there is no branching for Everettians. There is no branching at the level of the underlying physics. But in another sense the Everettian interpretation clearly does postulate branching. Everettians hold that after the measurement decoherence generates a part of reality that behaves like a quasi-classical world and contains a post-fission agent who sees spin-up, and another part of reality that behaves analogously and contains a post-fission agent who sees spin-down. From this perspective it is misleading to talk of a 'single world' in both the Everettian and simplified Sleeping Beauty cases. Where the single world containing Sleeping Beauty is metaphysically familiar, the Everettian world is a multiverse containing many separate branches of reality resulting from decoherence.
Still, we needn't fight about the terminology of 'branching'. For Lewis quickly moves onto another tack. He says that he is happy to allow that there are genuine metaphysical differences between the two cases. But he then argues that these metaphysical differences can't really matter, given that the two cases are carefully constructed to be epistemically parallel. This is where we think Lewis goes wrong: he is here assuming that the rational assignments of credences can be settled independently of metaphysics. But we see no reason for this assumption. After all, on the conventional interpretation of quantum mechanics, nobody thinks that the assignment of credences to quantum results is independent of metaphysical matters. On the contrary, it is universally agreed that the rational strategy is to match your credences to the objective quantum probabilities, in line with David Lewis's (1986: 87) Principal Principle.
Everettians will agree that subjects should match their degrees of belief to the objective quantum probabilities. The issue is then where such probabilities are to be found. Everettians say that they arise specifically when decoherence yields quasi-classical branches of reality, and moreover that they are equal to the squared moduli of the amplitudes of those branches.
Against this background, it is irrelevant that there are certain experiential parallels between simplified Sleeping Beauty and Everettian spin measurements. Everettians will simply respond that the Sleeping Beauty scenario does not involve the kind of metaphysical structure that gives rise to nonunitary quantum probabilities, for lack of any decoherent branching.
Since there is no decoherent branching in the Sleeping Beauty case, the objective probabilities of waking on Monday and Tuesday are both 1.
In the spin-measurement case, by contrast, there is branching, with the squared moduli of the amplitudes of each branch equal to 1/2. The rational degrees of belief follow suit, in line with the Principal Principle. The point is that rational subjective probabilities here track objective ones, and the objective probabilities depend on the metaphysical structure. Far from being irrelevant, the metaphysical structure is crucial to the determination of rational degrees of belief. 1 King's College London Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK david.papineau@kcl.ac.uk
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